Validated in the artifact environment:
Target-system validation still required:
The 2.5.6 source keeps the 2.5.4/2.5.5 production emission filter, but separates what is recorded from what interrupts the desktop user. Global privilege metadata is classified as Telemetry, Observation or Incident. Only direct/high-signal transitions create popup incidents; lower-confidence global events remain visible as observations. Protected-path semantics are unchanged. Xattr events now carry the target inode mode and parses the LSM operation flag so security.capability additions/replacements are promoted only when the target is executable; removals remain observations.
The 2.5.4 source narrows global metadata emission to privilege-relevant transitions and adds a UI-side compatibility filter so historical broad-audit records cannot create incident popup storms. Protected-path semantics are unchanged.
Global metadata remains enabled, but eBPF now samples only a bounded number of high-signal records per execution-domain window and counts destructive permission/ownership storms without emitting one record per operation. The domain combines cgroup with actor/parent executable identity so unrelated desktop processes do not share a cooldown. A threshold crossing emits one RG_REASON_METADATA_BURST record and then observes a kernel cooldown. Explicit protected identities bypass sampling and retain their original block/audit semantics. The GTK layer treats normal global records as observations, limits burst popups, and prioritizes protected/service incidents.
The C++ policy, file-identity and event-classification test suites pass in a daemon/GTK-disabled CMake build. Full eBPF verifier/load and GTK linkage still require a target Linux host with kernel BTF, libbpf/bpftool and gtkmm-4.0.