Privilege Escalation via WireGuard Configuration Parameters

CMS fields

• Advisory: Privilege Escalation via WireGuard Configuration Parameters
• Advisory ID: BGSA-2026-005 (proposed; confirm availability)
• Reporter reference: BG-04
• CVE: Not assigned
• Severity: Critical (researcher-assessed; no CVSS score assigned)
• Affected version: 2.0.3 — commit bb3a210 (reproduced by the maintainer)
• Fixed version: 2.0.4 (maintainer-confirmed corrected release)
• Status: Draft — publication pending coordinated disclosure
• Meta title: BastionGuard WireGuard Privilege Escalation | BGSA-2026-005
• Meta description: Advisory for reported unsafe handling of imported WireGuard Address and DNS fields in a privileged configuration workflow.
• Index: No while draft; Yes after coordinated publication
• Redirect: None
• Suggested slug: wireguard-configuration-privilege-escalation

Advisory body (English)

Summary

Imported WireGuard configuration values in Address and DNS fields were reported to reach a privileged shell script without sufficiently strict validation.

Security impact

When a malicious configuration is imported and activated, execution within a privileged network-setup workflow could permit unauthorized commands with elevated privileges.

Affected and fixed versions

The project maintainer reproduced the reported vulnerability in BastionGuard 2.0.3, commit bb3a210. The correction is included in BastionGuard 2.0.4, as confirmed by the maintainer and supported by the reviewed source and regression tests. Versions other than the confirmed affected revision have not been exhaustively assessed.

Remediation

• Validate IP addresses, CIDR prefixes and DNS values before building any network configuration commands.
• Use explicit process argument vectors for privileged network operations rather than interpolating imported values into shell scripts.
• Treat imported VPN profiles as untrusted data, including when privileged authorization is granted.

Recommended action: Upgrade to the verified official BastionGuard 2.0.4 build or a later maintained release.

Verification scope

The corrected source includes IP/CIDR and DNS validation and avoids the reported shell-based address-configuration path. The maintainer reproduced the historical issue; independent real-network Polkit/WireGuard exploit retesting of the corrected build was not performed in this audit environment.

Credits

Reported by Shaik Ikram. The project thanks the researcher for the responsible security report and requests that publication be coordinated with the researcher’s agreed disclosure schedule.

References

• BastionGuard source repository
• Security policy

Timeline

• Report received: October 2026
• Disclosure date: To be agreed / added before publication
• Fix release date: Confirm from the published 2.0.4 release record

Editorial verification (not part of public advisory): Maintainer confirms reproduction on bb3a210 and remediation in 2.0.4. Before publication, record the released package/tag and date, reserve the advisory ID, agree disclosure timing and credit with the researcher, and evaluate CVE eligibility through the appropriate CNA. Do not invent a CVE or CVSS score.